ASSIGNMENT代写

明尼苏达代写Assignment:从(BIV1)到达(TC)

2018-10-07 12:20

我曾试图论证一个人不能从(BIV1)到达(TC);然而,任何赞同普特南反对“大缸里的大脑”的人可能会持相反的观点。认识到围绕这个论点的条件是很重要的。更准确地说,普特南假设我们生活在自然界。怀疑论者的主要论点是,我们缺乏知识来辨别我们是否作为大脑存在于大缸中。只有当我们确定引用了哪些实例时,我们才能区分实例和vat的使用。语义外部性缺乏将我们从怀疑论假设中解放出来的能力。帕特南没能证明我们在缸里不能是大脑,但他确实证明了,如果我们是BIV,说出“我是BIV”,我们就不会知道。他没有抓住一个逻辑循环,他真正展示的是,缸里的大脑不知道它是缸里的大脑。如果帕特南关于语义外部性的观点是正确的,但是我们是大桶里的大脑,那么我们就缺乏讨论有形世界的能力。例如,如果我们假设我们是vats中的大脑,当我在前面的句子中说世界是“有形世界”时,我实际上指的是人工世界,因为我一直在与人工世界互动。因此,如果怀疑论者是正确的,我们就不知道自己是不是缸里的大脑,也假设普特南的语义外部性同样是正确的,那么我们就确实缺乏对词汇中单词含义的知识。更准确地说,假设交互仍然是获得理解和意义的关键,那么就有必要准确地了解我们必须交互的内容。希拉里·普特南(Hilary Putnam)试图接受语义外部性,希望将我们从怀疑论者手中解放出来;然而,Putnam确实说明了BIV’s不能说甚至不能认为他们是BIV,因此说明了语义外部性的困惑。
明尼苏达代写Assignment:从(BIV1)到达(TC)
I have attempted to argue that one cannot get to (TC) from (BIV1); however, anyone who subscribes to Putnam’s argument against brains-in-vats might argue the opposite. It is important to recognize the conditions surrounding the argument. More precisely, Putnam presupposes we live in the natural world. The skeptic’s main argument is that we lack the knowledge to discern whether or not we exist as brains in vats. We would only be able to differentiate between the instances and the vat usage if we new definitively which instances were being referenced.Semantic externalism lacks the ability to liberate us from a skeptical hypothesis. Putnam fails to show that we can not be Brains in Vats, but he does show that if we were a BIV and uttered the phrase “I am a BIV,” we would not know it. He fails to cinch a logical loop and all he really shows is that the brain in the vat couldn’t know it was a brain-in-a-vat. If Putnam’s version of semantic externalism is correct, but we are brains in vats, then we lack the ability to discuss the tangible-world. For example, if we assume that we are brains in vats, when I said the worlds “tangible-world” in the previous sentence, I was actually referring to the artificial world because that is what I have been interacting with. Therefore, provided that the skeptic is correct that we would not know if we were brains in a vat, and also assuming that Putnam’s semantic externalism is similarly correct, then we simply do lack the knowledge of the meaning of the words in our vocabulary. More precisely, assuming that interaction remains critical to gaining understanding and meaning, then it becomes a necessity to know precisely with what we must interact. Hilary Putnam attempted to embrace semantic externalism in hopes of freeing us from skeptics; however, Putnam did illustrate that BIV’s wouldn’t be able to say or even think they were BIVs, thereby demonstrating a quandary for semantic externalism.